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This paper studies the relation between human capital of suicide bombers and outcomes of their suicide
attacks. We argue that human capital is an important factor in the production of terrorism, and that
if terrorists behave rationally we should observe that more able suicide bombers are assigned to more
important targets. We use a unique data set detailing the biographies of Palestinian suicide bombers,
the targets they attack, and the number of people that they kill and injure to validate the theoretical
predictions and estimate the returns to human capital in suicide bombing. Our empirical analysis suggests
that older and more educated suicide bombers are being assigned by their terror organization to more
important targets. We find that more educated and older suicide bombers are less likely to fail in their
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Since the onset of the Palestinian Intifada in September 2000 through August 2005, 151 Palestinian
suicide bombing attacks have been launched against Israeli targets, killing 515 people and injuring
almost 3,500 more. Estimates of the number of casualties from suicide bombing in Iraq suggest that
since 2003 thousands of people, mostly Iraqi civilians, have been killed. According to Pape (2005),
from 1987 to 2001, the Tamil Tigers launched 76 suicide bombing attacks, killing a total of 901
people, including two regional leaders - India’s former prime minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991, and
Sri Lanka’s President Ranasinghe Premadasa in 1993. However, while suicide terrorism is rising
around the world, there is little empirical academic research in economics that analyzes suicide
terrorism. This paper studies the individual rationality of suicide bombing using micro-level data.
Recent theories have suggested that suicide terrorism can be explained using rational choice
modeling. For example, Becker and Posner (2005), Berman (2004), Berman and Laitin (2005),
and Iannaccone (2006) analyze the costs and beneﬁts to suicide bombers and terror organizations
that are associated with suicide attacks. The theoretical approach of the analysis of participation
in terrorism relies on Becker’s theory of rational crime (Becker 1968), which predicts that crime
decreases as one’s market wage increases relative to the rewards associated with crime. However,
existing empirical evidence suggests that Palestinian suicide bombers do not come from poor eco-
nomic conditions and are more educated compared to the Palestinian population (Berrebi 2003,
Krueger and Maleˇ ckov´ a 2003).
In this paper, we study the relation between human capital of suicide bombers and the outcomes
of their suicide attacks. We followthe approach of ‘rational sacriﬁce’ developed in Iannaccone (1992,
2006), where rational actors who sacriﬁce their lives obtain beneﬁts from their suicide related
activities. Similar to Becker and Posner (2005), we assume that human capital is an important
factor in the production of suicide terrorism, and thus more able suicide bombers should be assigned
in equilibrium to targets that are associated with greater rewards.
The equilibrium outcome of the market for suicide bombers has two important predictions.
First, more able suicide bombers will be assigned to targetsthat are associated with greater rewards.
Second, more able individuals are more productive when assigned to more important targets. The
intuition behind our analysis is straightforward; an individual will engage in suicide bombing if
and only if the payoﬀ from sacriﬁcing himself is larger than his reservation wage in the productive
1sector. Since there are returns to human capital in both the productive and the terror sectors,
high ability individuals will become suicide bombers if the expected payoﬀ from suicide bombing
is higher than their skill-adjusted expected lifetime earnings in the productive sector. Similarly,
rational terror organizations will assign suicide bombers to targets according to their abilities.
The key assumption in our analysis is that human capital is an important input in the production
of suicide terrorism. Suicide attacks are complex tasks that require a considerable level of task
speciﬁc and general human capital. Suicide bombers have to reach their targets and often have to
disguise themselves to blend into local population. After reaching the target, suicide bombers must
decide on the timing and the exact location of their attack. For example, when attempting to blow
up a bus, a suicide bomber has to trade-oﬀ the expected number of passengers that will get on and
oﬀ in the next stop against the likelihood that he will be captured if he waits before detonating his
explosive device.
We use a unique database that was constructed from reports of the Israeli Security Agency
(ISA). The data detail the biographies of Palestinian suicide bombers between the years 2000 and
2005, including detailed information about the targets they attacked, and number of people that
they killed and injured. We analyze the assignment of suicide bombers to targets as a function of
their ability. We assume that older suicide bombers have more general human capital than younger
suicide bombers, and that educated suicide bombers are either more able or have acquired speciﬁc
human capital compared to those who are not educated. We ﬁnd that the suicide bomber’s age
and education and the importance of the target are strongly correlated; older and more educated
suicide bombers are assigned to attack more important targets.
Next, we turn to analyze the productivity of suicide bombers by estimating a production func-
tion of suicide bombing. We use the number of people that were killed or injured in a suicide
attack as our output measures. We estimate the eﬀects of educational attainment and age of sui-
cide bombers on the number of people killed and injured. Our empirical analysis suggests that
the returns to the age and education of a suicide bomber in the production of suicide attacks are
positive and increasing in the target’s ranking. Older and more educated suicide bombers kill more
people when they attack more important targets. Finally, we ﬁnd that more educated and older
Palestinian suicide bombers are less likely to fail or to be caught during their attacks, emphasizing
the importance of human capital in the production of suicide bombing.
Our paper also sheds additional light on the link between education and terrorism. Given the
2quality of the data, we were able to update the estimates of educational attainment of Palestinian
suicide bombers. Consistent with the estimates in Berrebi (2003), the share of academic degree
holders in our sample is larger than the reported share of degree holders among the overall compa-
rable Palestinian population. However, our estimates are much smaller. We attribute the diﬀerence
to both the diﬀerent periods from which the samples were drawn, as well as a potential upward
bias in Berrebi’s data due to the exclusion of failed suicide bombers that may result in a selection
bias.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a theoretical framework for the
analysis of the market for suicide bombers. Data sources and summary statistics are described
in Section II. Section III discusses the empirical analysis of the model. Section IV studies the
determinants of caught suicide bombers. Section V concludes.
I. The Market for Suicide Bombers
In this section we review the literature on the market for suicide bombers. We discuss how the
interaction between ability of suicide bombers and the availability of potential targets aﬀect the
demand and supply for suicide bombers.1
A. The Demand for Suicide Bombers
Recent work by Bueno de Mesquita (2005), and Ianaconne (2006) analyze the demand for suicide
bombers. According to Iannaccone (2006), the high cost of incompetent, unreliable or untrustwor-
thy suicide bombers predicts that, on the demand side, suicide bombers will tend to be relatively
well educated and mentally stable. Likewise, Bueno de Mesquita (2005) develops a model in which
terrorist organization wants to recruit only the most eﬀective, highly skilled terrorists, since higher
ability people are more likely to succeed at terrorist attacks. While our work is motivated by the
relation between ability and terrorism that Bueno de Mesquita (2005) and Ianaconne (2006) ana-
lyze, we relax the assumption of a constant wage for all terrorist operatives. Some terrorist tasks
are more demanding than others and require a considerable level of task speciﬁc and general hu-
man capital. Since some targets are more important and thus are more rewarding from the suicide
bomber’s perspective, it is not clear that suicide bombers in all targets will be higher ability, better
1There is a growing body of literature that analyze the rationality of terror organizations (i.e. Berman (2004),
Berrebi and Klor (2005), Iannaccone (2006), Kydd and Walter (2002)).
3educated people.
B. The Supply of Suicide Bombers
To analyze the supply side we follow Iannaccone’s approach of ‘rational sacriﬁce’, where rational
actors who sacriﬁce their lives obtain beneﬁts from their suicide related activities.2 He writes:
“[T]he beneﬁts will start well before the sacriﬁcial acts (as when the volunteer is honored by his
comrades or rewarded by his leaders) and extend well beyond (and, perhaps into a life after death).”
The beneﬁts of suicide related activities include: fame, honor, and recognition; moral status; value
of accomplishment; beneﬁcial consequences and rewards for signiﬁcant others; beneﬁcial conse-
quences and rewards for self, and the magnitude of harm and humiliation imposed on enemies. It
is likely that the beneﬁts that Iannaccone lists are increasing in the suicide bomber’s ability. For
example, fame, honor, and recognition are higher for suicide bombers that are successful in killing
more enemies. If able suicide bombers are capable of launching more successful attacks, rational
talented individuals will be willing to participate in large scale suicide attacks. Likewise, value of
accomplishment, beneﬁcial consequences and rewards for self, and harm and humiliation imposed
on enemies, are all increasing in the expected impact of a suicide bombing attack.
Similarly, Becker and Posner (2005) develop a model where suicide bombers derive utility from
sacriﬁcing their life and killing members of a hated group. In their model, persons with high
reservation wages would only accept suicide missions that have high expected payoﬀs. The Becker
and Posner model suggests that successful suicide attacks, such as the 9/11 attacks, are produced
by suicide bombers who have high reservation wages and are potentially more educated and older.
If terror organizations match able individuals to targets with larger impact, then more able suicide
bombers enjoy a higher expected stream of beneﬁts well before the sacriﬁcial act.
C. Equilibrium in the Market for Suicide Bombers
In an earlier version of this paper [Benmelech and Berrebi (2006)], we developed a price theory
model of attack assignments in terror organizations. In our model, human capital is an important
factor in the production of suicide terrorism, and more able suicide bombers are assigned in equi-
librium to targets that are associated with greater rewards. Our analysis is similar to Becker and
2While there is empirical evidence on the relation between economic distress and unemployment, and suicide in
general (e.g. Krug et al. 1998, Aihara and Iki 2002, Kposowa 2001), and between income and suicide rates (Helliwell
2004), the typical proﬁle of suicide bombers is diﬀerent than those who commit suicide in general (Berrebi 2003,
Krueger and Maleˇ ckov´ a 2003).
4Posner’s model in which diﬀerent missions have diﬀerent payoﬀs, and a terrorist organization allo-
cates diﬀerent missions to potential suicide bombers given their incentive-compatibilityconstraints.
Likewise, Krueger and Maleˇ ckov´ a(2003) suggest that on the supply side terrorism may oﬀer greater
beneﬁts for those with more education, and that on the demand side terrorist organization may
prefer to choose those who have better education.
The equilibrium predictions of this theoretical framework is that more able individuals will be
assigned to more important targets ex-ante, and that more able individuals have a comparative
advantage in more important targets and thus are more eﬀective (i.e. kill more) when assigned to
more important targets.
II. Data and Descriptive Statistics
We use a unique data set that includes characteristics of Palestinian suicide bombers and the
outcomes of their attacks. The data set contains detailed information on all suicide attacks by
Palestinian against Israeli targets in Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza strip between September
2000 and August 2005. The data is taken from reports of the Israeli Security Agency (ISA) that
include a brief biography of the suicide bombers, a detailed description of the attack (including a
description of the target and its location), and detailed information about the number of people
killed and injured in the attack. We augment the data (when possible) with information from the
web sites of the Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ).3 The unusual nature and sources of the
dataset are important for the reliability of the data. Since praising Shahids (martyrs) is a divine
obligation in Islam, it is possible that terror organizations will praise suicide bombers as part of a
religious obligation or mere propaganda. However, since we have detailed information about the
biographies of suicide bombers from the ISA, we were able to check the reliabilityof the information
reported by the terror organizations. After translating the biographies from the web sites of the
Hamas and PIJ, (which is in Arabic), and the data from the ISA, (which is in Hebrew) we ﬁnd no
disparities between the two sources in the biographies of the suicide bombers.
A. Suicide Attacks
Our data set spans almost 5 years of the Israeli-Palestinian confrontation from September 2000 to
August 2005. The ISA reports cover 151 suicide bombing attacks carried out by 168 suicide bombers
3See Berrebi (2003) for details on the Hamas and the PIJ web sites.
5in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza. In the 151 suicide attacks that are included in the data set,
515 Israelis were killed and 3,428 were injured. According to the ISA, there were about 25,000
Palestinian attacks against Israeli citizens and residents between September 2000 and August 2005.
In those attacks more than 1,000 Israelis were killed. While suicide attacks account for only 0.6%
of the total number of attacks, the number of Israelis who were killed in suicide attacks is more
than half the number of Israelis killed in Palestinian attacks during this period. We restrict our
sample to attacks in which we have information about the age and education of suicide bombers.
We also eliminate suicide attacks that were launched by non Palestinians or in which we could not
identify the target. After imposing these requirements on the data we end up with 135 suicide
bombing attacks carried out by 148 suicide bombers. Our sample represents 89.4% of the total
number of suicide attacks between September 2000 and August 2005, 88.1% of the suicide bombers,
and 98.1% of the Israelis who were killed in suicide attacks.
Figure 1 displays the number of suicide attacks, number of people killed, and number of those
who were injured in suicide attacks from September 2000 to August 2005. The al-Aqsa intifada4
began on September 29, 2000 and thus there were fewer suicide attacks in the year 2000. There
were 60 suicide attacks in 2002 (out of which 55 are included in our sample), almost twice as many
as the number of attacks in the years 2001 and 2003. There was a gradual decline in the number
of attacks in the years 2004 and 2005.
There is positive correlation between the number of suicide attacks and the number of people
killed and injured in these attacks. For example, in 2000 there are 3 suicide attacks in our sample
in which there were no casualties. In contrast, in 2002 there are 55 suicide attacks in our sample
that killed 216 and injured 1,308 people. The correlation between the number of suicide attacks
and the number of people killed in these attacks within a year is 0.95. Likewise the correlation
between the number of suicide attacks and the number of people injured in these attacks within a
year is 0.95. Finally, the correlation between the number of people killed and the number of those
who were injured in suicide attacks within a year is 0.94. All correlations are signiﬁcant at the
1 percent level. Table 1 reports detailed summary statistics for the number of people killed and
injured in suicide attacks. The mean number of individuals killed (injured) in a suicide attack in
the full sample is 3.7 (24.2). The average number of killed (injured) people in suicide attacks was
2.8 (27.9) in 2001, 3.9 (23.8) in 2002, 5.6 (27.4) in 2003, 4.2 (21.8) in 2004, and 1.2 (16.4) in 2005.
4Intifada is an Arabic word for uprising - literally translated as ‘shaking oﬀ’.
6As Figure 2 demonstrates, 39.9% of the suicide attacks in our sample were carried out by Hamas,
25.7% by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), 26.4% by the Fatah, 5.4% by the Popular Front for
the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and 2.7% by other organization. The Hamas and the PIJ,
the two Islamic Palestinian terrorist organizations carried out 65.5% of the suicide attacks in our
sample.
B. Suicide Bombers
Our sample includes 148 suicide bombers for whom we know their names, membership in terror
organization, age, city of residence, marital status and whether they had an academic degree or
were enrolled in a higher-education institution. There are 8 female and 140 male suicide bombers in
the sample. The youngest suicide bomber is 12 years old, and the oldest is 48. The mean age of the
suicide bombers is 21.1, the median is 20.5 and the standard deviation is 4.7 years. These results
are similar to previous ﬁnding regarding the age of Palestinian suicide bombers. For example, using
a sample of 63 suicide bombers, Berrebi (2003) ﬁnds that 8% of the suicide bombers were between
the ages of 15 and 17, 67% were in the range of 18-24, and 25% were 25 or older. While the three
suicide bombers that are in our sample for the year 2000 are 24, 25 and 27 years old, respectively,
the mean age of the suicide bombers in the years 2001-2005 is between 17.6 and 23.4. We measure
education using a dummy variable that equals 1 for those who went beyond high school education.
We treat students in academic institutions as if they have higher education even if they did not
graduate when they carried out a suicide attack. We ﬁnd that 18.0% of the suicide bombers went
beyond high school education, compared with only 8% in the Palestinian population as reported
by Berrebi (2003).5
C. Measuring Target Impact
In order to estimate the relation between targets, suicide bombers and suicide attacks’ outcomes,
we need a measure of target importance. A sensible proxy for the importance of a target is the size
of a city in which the target is located. A target in a large city is potentially more valuable than a
target in a smaller city.6 Likewise, a civil target in an Israeli city is potentially more valuable than
a military target in Israel or in the West Bank and Gaza. We construct two measures of target
5Berrebi measures education attainment in the Palestinian society of Muslim males between the ages of 16 and
50 using the 1993 Labor Force Surveys in Judea, Samaria and Gaza.
6We measure city size using population within the metro area of the city.
7importance. Our ﬁrst measure is a dummy variable that equals to one for cities with a population
of more than 50,000, and zero otherwise. We construct the “Target Index” using the Israeli Central
Bureau of Statistics (CBS) population ﬁgures for the year 2003. Our second measure of target
importance is a dummy variable that equals to one for civil targets, and equals zero for military
targets.
Table 2 displays the ex-post outcomes of suicide attacks stratiﬁed by the two measures of target
importance. As Table 2 illustrates, there is positive correlation between the number of people
killed in attacks and the target’s ranking; (correlation=0.38, p-value=0.00 for larger cities, and
correlation=0.31, p-value=0.00 for civil targets). For example, the mean number of people killed
(per attack) in targets in smaller cities is 1.4, and the mean number of people killed in targets in
larger cities is 6.2. Furthermore, the mean number of people killed (per attack) in military targets is
0.3, and the mean number of people killed in civil targets is 5.0. There is also a positive correlation
between the number of people injured in attacks and the target’s ranking (correlation=0.51, p-
value=0.00 for largercities, and correlation=0.36,p-value=0.00 for civil targets). The mean number
of people injured (per attack) in targets in smaller cities is 7.0, and the mean number of people
injured (per attack) in targets in larger cities is 42.6. Similarly, the mean number of people injured
in military targets is 2.4, and the mean number of people injured in civil targets is 32.5. The results
are consistent with Berrebi and Lakdawalla (2006) ﬁndings that city population is strongly and
positively correlated with terror attack frequency in Israel.
III. Empirical Analysis
In this section we attempt to test the relation between the age and education of suicide bombers
and the outcomes of their attacks.
A. Evidence from Successful Suicide Bombers
Table 3 lists the top-ﬁve suicide bombers ranked based on the number of people killed in their
attacks.7 The table reports the characteristics of the suicide bombers (name, age, education, and
terror organization aﬃliation) and detailed information about the attack (date, location, number
of people killed and injured). The average age of the top-ﬁve suicide bombers is 25.8 compared to
7The list includes ‘stand-alone’ suicide bombers, and excludes suicide attacks with more than one suicide bomber
such as the attack on January 5th, 2003 in which two suicide bombers blew themselves up in the old central bus
station in Tel Aviv resulting in 23 killed and 106 wounded people.
8an average age of 20.9 in the rest of the sample, (p-value of a t-test on the means=0.02). Three
out of the top-ﬁve suicide bombers had academic degrees, 2 were masters’ candidates and one had
a degree in law, while only 17.0% of the suicide bombers in the rest of the sample had or were
perusing academic degrees (p-value of a t-test on the means=0.02). The top-ﬁve suicide bombers
which appear to be more educated and older than suicide bombers in the full sample, killed on
average 22.8 people compared to the rest of the sample mean of 3.0 (t-test on the means=0.00),
and injured on average 88.0 people compared with a mean of 25.2 in the rest of the sample (p-value
of a t-test on the means=0.00). Furthermore, all the top-ﬁve suicide bombers attacked targets in
large Israeli cities; while only 52.7% of the suicide bombers in the full sample attacked in these
cities. The anecdotal evidence in Table 3 suggests that the best performing suicide bombers tend
to be older and more educated, and are also more likely to attack targets in major cities. In our
empirical analysis we use the age and education of suicide bombers as proxies for their skills. We
assume that older suicide bombers have more general human capital than younger suicide bombers.
General human capital is in particular important in the case of suicide bombers since on-the-job
human capital accumulation and learning by doing are not feasible. We also assume that educated
suicide bombers are either more able or have acquired speciﬁc human capital compared to those
who are not educated.
B. Ex-Ante Assignment of Suicide Bombers to Targets
We begin the regression analysis with a test of a simple assignment model, which predicts that
higher ability suicide bombers are assigned to more important targets. In Models 1-2 we estimate
the following regression:
TargetIndexi = F(agei,academic i,X
i)+ i, (1)
where Xi is a vector of control variables that includes terror organization indicator variables, a
dummy variable for attacks with more than one suicide bomber, and a dummy variable for military
targets (not reported). The coeﬃcients on age and academic should be positive and signiﬁcant if
older and educated suicide bombers are assigned to more important targets.
Model 1 in Table 4 estimates a probit regression (marginal eﬀects are reported). As Table 4
shows age and the Target Index are correlated, but there is no relationship between academic and
the Target Index. The coeﬃcient on age equals 0.04 and is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent
9level, while the coeﬃcient on academic is not statistically diﬀerent from zero. The marginal eﬀect
of one year of age is large and represents an increase of 4 percentage points in the probability that
a suicide bomber will be assigned to a target in a large city. To get better understanding of the
economic magnitude, note that a 25 year old suicide bomber has a 28 percentage points higher
probability to be assigned to a target in a large city (representing an increase of 53.1% relative
to the unconditional mean), than the assignment of an 18 year old suicide bomber. The marginal
eﬀect of an academic degree is not found to be a statistically signiﬁcant determinant of target
assignment. Similarly, using a logit regression in Model 2 we ﬁnd that age is positively correlated
with the Target Index, while academic is not statisticallysigniﬁcant. Thus, age (and not education)
appears to be an important characteristic that Palestinian terror organizations use for assigning
suicide bombers to targets in large Israeli cities.
In Models 3-4 in Table 4 our dependent variable is whether a suicide bomber is assigned to a
civil or military target. We estimate the following regression:
Military Targeti = F(agei,academic i,X
i)+ i, (2)
where Xi is a vector of control variables that includes terror organization indicator variables, and
a dummy variable for attacks with more than one suicide bomber (not reported).
Model 3 in Table 4 estimates a probit regression (marginal eﬀects are reported). As Model 3
demonstrates, there is a strong negative relationship between academic and the military targets.
Educated suicide bombers are 13 percentage points less likely to be assigned to military targets,
representing a decrease of 45.3% relative to the unconditional mean. The coeﬃcient on age however
is not statisticallysigniﬁcant. Likewise, in Model 4 we use a logit regression and ﬁnd similar results.
Thus, academic education (and not age) appears to be an important characteristic that Palestinian
terror organizations use for assigning suicide bombers to civil targets.
In Models 5-6 in Table 4 our dependent variable is the distance between the suicide bomber’s
locality or terror cell headquarters and the location of the target. If the likelihood of being captured
is increasing in the distance to the target, and depends on individual ability to avoid detection, then
more able suicide bombers might be sent to distant targets. On the other hand, if the likelihood of
being captured depends mainly on other factors such as the guiding driver skills, and is independent
of the suicide bomber’s skills, then a more able suicide bomber might be saved for closer targets.
We therefore do not hypothesize about the expected eﬀect of target’s distance on assignment. To
10estimate the relationship between target’s distance and the ability of the suicide bomber we use
the following baseline regression:
TargetDistance i = a + b × agei + c × academici + X
iΓ +  i (3)
where Xi is a vector of control variables that includes terror organization indicator variables,
a dummy variable for attacks with more than one suicide bomber, and a dummy variable for
military targets (not reported). We use two diﬀerent measures of the distance to the target: the
logarithm of the distance (Model 5) between the suicide bomber’s locality and the target, and the
logarithm of the distance (Model 6) between the terror cell headquarters and the target.8 As Table
4 demonstrates we do not ﬁnd evidence supporting that Palestinian terror organizations assign
older or more educated suicide bombers to neither targets that are further away, nor to those that
are closer to the hometown of the suicide bomber or the headquarters of its terror cell.
In summary, we ﬁnd that Palestinian terror organizations assign older and more educated
suicide bombers to targets in larger cities and to civil targets. However, age and education are not
correlated with distance between the target and the bomber or the terror cell location.
C. The Productivity of Suicide Bombers
We now turn to measure the relation between the ex-post outcomes of suicide attacks and the
characteristics of suicide bombers. We test whether older and more educated suicide bomber
are more productive when assigned to more important targets. The strategy for estimating this
prediction is to use the number of people that were killed or injured (the output of the production
of terror) as dependent variables. The baseline regression for this type of analysis is:
Killedi(Injuredi)=a + b × agei + c × academici + d × Target i
+ e × (agei × Target i)+f × (academici × Target i)+V
iΓ +  i (4)
where Vi is a vector of control variables that includes terror organization indicator variables, a
dummy variable for attacks with more than one suicide bomber, suicide attack type indicators, and
8We were able to match latitude-longitude coordinates to the targets and to the suicide bomber’s hometown
locality or to the terrorist cell headquarters location. We computed the distance between any two locations using
Haversine’s Formula (see Sinnott (1984) for further details about the about this procedure). The distance is measured
in kilometers.
11a dummy variable for military targets (not reported).9 Our measure of target importance in this
regression is the population-based city size measure, but our results hold with the civil/military
target measure as well. We exclude caught suicide bombers from the analysis in regression 4 in
order to focus on suicide bombers who actually reach their targets, and thus we have 106 suicide
bombers in Table 5. We analyze the determinants of caught suicide bombers in section IV. The
interaction terms in the regression measure the cross-partial derivatives of the production function







and should be positive if older and more educated suicide bombers perform better in more important
targets. We employ diﬀerent versions of regression 4 by estimating the coeﬃcients on age×Target
and academic×Targetseparately or alternatively by including both interaction terms in the same
regression.
Table 5 presents the results for the productivity of suicide bombers. The table shows that older
and educated suicide bombers are more eﬀective when assigned to more important targets. The
ﬁrst column in Table 5 shows that the coeﬃcient of age×Targetis indeed positive and signiﬁcant.
According to Table 5 the coeﬃcient e is 0.69 and is statistically diﬀerent from zero at the seven
percent level. In order to gauge the marginal eﬀect of age, taking into account the interaction
between age and Target, consider moving from a small city target (Target Index of 0) to a large
city target (Target Index of 1) for a 25 years old suicide bomber. The increase in the number of
people killed when moving from a Target Index of 0 to a Target Index of 1 for a 25 years old suicide
bomber is: −12.72 × 1+0 .69 × (25 × 1) − (−12.72 × 0+0 .69 × (25 × 0)) = 4.53. The marginal
eﬀect of targets on younger suicide bombers is close to zero, moving from a Target Index of 0 to a
Target Index of 1 for an 18 years old suicide bomber decreases the number of people killed by 0.3,
indicating that very young suicide bombers perform better when they are assigned to targets in
smaller cities. Interestingly, the coeﬃcient of age is negative but not statistically signiﬁcant when
an interaction term is included, indicating that conditional on Target Index=0 age has no impact
on the number of people killed or injured.
In the third and fourth columns of Table 5 we interact education (instead of age) with the
Target Index. The positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of academic × Target in column 3 suggests
9There are 9 suicide attack types in our sample; explosives belt, bag, bus attack, car, bike, boat, diver, tanker,
and wagon. The most common were: explosives belt, bag, car, and bus.
12that there are returns to education in the production of suicide attacks. An educated suicide
bomber kills 5.9 more people when he attacks a large city target (Target Index of 1) compared to
an uneducated suicide bomber. Interestingly, educated suicide bombers perform worse when they
attack less important targets.
We ﬁnd no statistical signiﬁcant returns to age or education when the production of suicide
bombing is measured using the number of people injured in an attack.10 Finally, in the last two
columns of Table 5 we employ the full speciﬁcation of Equation 4 including both interaction terms.
Consistent with our previous results we ﬁnd that both age × Target and academic × Target are
positive and signiﬁcant for the number of people killed.
IV. Evidence from Caught Suicide Bombers
In this section we supplement our analysis with empirical evidence on the relation between human
capital and the likelihood that a Palestinian suicide bomber will fail in his mission or that he will
be caught by Israeli security forces or civilians during his attack. Becker (2005) hypothesizes that
younger and less educated suicide bombers are more likely to fail in their missions. He writes:
Any terrorist organization has available a supply of potential suicide bombers or other
terrorists who have diﬀerent levels of education and economic opportunities. To make
my point in a simple way, suppose all potential bombers gain the same utility from
destroying members of a hated group, such as Israelis, through successful attacks that
are likely also to kill the bombers. Suppose too, they suﬀer to the same extent if they
fail in their missions - they may be captured without hurting anyone, or they may only
kill themselves.
Recruits with good economic opportunities would only be willing to undertake suicide
missions that have a relatively high likelihood of destroying some enemies too. For they
would not be willing to go on missions that have little chance of succeeding since they
would then prefer safer terrorist activities, or doing well economically while working
peacefully. In this case, relatively highly educated terrorists will be sent on missions
that are more likely to succeed in destroying their enemies as well as themselves. As a
result, the education and other determinants of the economic opportunities of successful
10We believe that this is probably due to the diﬀerent types and levels of injuries, as well as reporting requirements
that mask the analysis.
13bombers will exceed the opportunities of bombers who fail (and who may be captured).
[T]he education of captured bombers would be less than the education of all bombers since
low educated individuals, such as the many teenagers sent on suicide eﬀorts to Israel,
would go on missions with smaller chances of succeeding. 11
In order to test the hypothesis that less educated and younger suicide bombers are more likely
to fail in their missions, we identify caught suicide bombers using the ISA reports. We classify
attackers as caught suicide bombers if they: i) have failed to detonate their explosive devices, ii)
looked suspicious and were apprehended, or killed by civilians, policemen or soldiers, iii) panicked
and blew themselves up before they reach the target or died during capture, or iv) chickened out.
There are 42 suicide bombers in the sample that are classiﬁed as caught suicide bombers, out of
them 18 (42.9%) were caught alive, and 24 (57.1%) were killed.
A. Univariate Analysis
Table 6 splits the sample into two subsamples of caught and uncaught suicide bombers, and reports
summary statistics for their age and education. The table demonstrates that there are diﬀerences
in age and educational attainment between caught and uncaught suicide bombers. According to
Panel A the average age of a caught suicide bomber is 18.8, while uncaught suicide bombers are
on average 3.2 years older, and the diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant (two-sample t-test for equal
means is signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level). Likewise, the median caught suicide bomber is 19 years
old, three years younger than the median uncaught suicide bomber.
Panel B of Table 6 compares educational attainment between caught and uncaught suicide
bombers. While 23% of the uncaught suicide bombers went beyond high school education, only 7%
of the caught suicide bombers had an academic education. The diﬀerence in educational attainment
between caught and uncaught suicide bombers is sizeable (16 percentage points, signiﬁcant at the
3 percent level), and represent a 88.9% decrease in the likelihood of being educated compared to
the mean.
B. Multivariate Analysis
Table 7 presents probit and logit estimates (marginal eﬀects are reported, p-values in parenthesis)
of the determinants of the probability that a suicide bomber will be caught either before or during
11See The Becker-Posner Blog (a blog by Gary Becker and Richard Posner, May 29, 2005 http://www.becker-
posner-blog.com/archives/2005/05/).
14his attack. All the regressions include an intercept (coeﬃcient is not reported for brevity), and
standard errors are calculated using clustering by attack location. The regressions results are
consistent with the univariate analysis in Table 6. An additional year of age is associated with a
decrease of between 4 and 5 percentage points in the probability of being caught, a reduction of
between 14.1% and 17.6% relative to the sample mean. Likewise, suicide bombers who went beyond
high school education are between 15 and 16 percentage points less likely to be caught, which is a
between 52.9 and 56.4 percent decrease from the 28.4 percent frequency of caught suicide bombers
in the sample. The last two regressions include additional control variables; dummy variables for
the Hamas, PIJ and the Fatah, a dummy variable that equals to one if more than one bomber
participated in an attack, and zero otherwise, and a dummy variable for military targets. Our
results conﬁrm Becker’s (2005) predictions that caught or failed suicide bombers should be younger
and less educated, and are in general consistent with our model that emphasize the importance of
human capital in suicide bombing.
C. The Education of Suicide Bombers
Our results also shed more light on the link between education and terrorism. While suicide
bombers are on average more educated than the general Palestinian population, our estimate of
higher education among suicide bombers is lower than the ﬁgures reported by Berrebi (2003) and
Krueger and Maleˇ ckov´ a (2003). Berrebi (2003) ﬁnds that 55% of the suicide bombers for whom
he was able to ﬁnd information on education had or were perusing academic education. Berrebi’s
ﬁgure is more than three times our estimate of 18%.12
It is possible that a selection bias drives the diﬀerences in the estimates of education among
suicide bombers. In order to obtain data on suicide bombers, Berrebi (2003) collects biographical
data on successful terrorist attack against Israelis from 1949 to May 2002. Berrebi (2003) identiﬁes
terror attacks using data from the Israeli Foreign Ministry and the National Insurance Institute
of Israel. His data does not include suicide bombers who were caught or failed in their mission,
or suicide bombers that did not succeed in killing others.13 However, the evidence in this paper
shows that failed and caught suicide bombers are less educated than those who do not fail in
12The evidence on the eﬀects of education on suicide rates in general is mixed. Durkheim (1952) argues that
education encourages inquiry and is likely to be associated with higher suicide rates. However, many modern empirical
studies found that suicide rates of students were below those of demographically matched cohorts (Helliwell 2004).
13See Berrebi (2003) footnote 36.
15their missions. Krueger and Maleˇ ckov´ a (2003) argue along these lines that terror organizations
may prefer to select those who have better education since a high level of education attainment is
probably a signal of commitment, as well as of ability to carry an attack. Similarly, Becker (2005)
argues that: “the sample of bombers or other terrorists must be representative of all terrorists -
not mainly either failures or successes - before reliable conclusions can be drawn about the relation
between economic opportunities and the recruitment of terrorists.” Since failed suicide bombers
are less likely to be educated, previous estimates of academic education along the lines of Berrebi
(2003) are probably biased upward.
Another potential explanation is that Berrebi (2003) uses data on suicide bombing attacks
between 1993 and 2002, and it is possible that the characteristics of suicide bombers have changed
during the period 2001-2005. According to the ISA there were 38 suicide bombing attacks that
were carried out by 43 individual suicide bombers between 1993 and September 2000, while there
were 151 suicide bombing attacks by 168 suicide bombers from September 2000 to August 2005. If
there is excess demand for suicide bombers (as might have been the case in the al-Aqsa intifada),
terror organizations might become less selective in recruiting potential suicide bombers.
V. Conclusion
This paper provides the ﬁrst detailed analysis of the relationship between suicide bombers char-
acteristics and their performance in suicide bombing attacks. We ﬁnd evidence that Palestinian
terror organizations match older and more educated suicide bombers to more important Israeli tar-
gets. We also ﬁnd that older and more educated suicide bombers kill more people in their suicide
attacks when assigned to important targets. Furthermore, we also ﬁnd that older and educated
suicide bombers are less likely to fail or to be caught when they attack. Our evidence suggests
that, as predicted by economic theory, suicide bombers plausibly maximize an expected payoﬀ from
their attacks. The evidence conﬁrms the prediction that older and more educated suicide bombers
are more eﬀective when assigned to more important targets, and that older and educated suicide
bombers are more likely to launch successful attacks without being caught.
Our paper also contributes to the debate on the relation between education, poverty and ter-
rorism. We revise the existing estimate of the proportion of suicide bombers who either have an
academic degree or are enrolled as students in academic institutions. While our estimate is still
16signiﬁcantly higher than the average educational attainment in the Palestinian society it is lower
than previous estimates of educational attainment of suicide bombers. We argue that sample se-
lection may bias the estimates of education among suicide bombers since less educated bombers
are signiﬁcantly more likely to fail in their mission.
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21Table 1:
Characteristics of Suicide Attacks
Number killed Number injured
Number of
Attacks Mean Max Std Mean Max Std
Full sample 135 3.7 29 6.1 24.2 170 32.6
2000 3 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 3 1.5
2001 30 2.8 22 5.5 27.9 170 40.4
2002 55 3.9 29 6.2 23.8 144 27.6
2003 25 5.6 23 7.8 27.4 115 36.7
2004 13 4.2 16 5.3 21.8 100 30.2
2005 9 1.2 5 2.2 16.4 88 31.8
Notes: This table reports the number of attacks, and summary statistics for the number of people killed and injured in
suicide attacks, for each of the years in the sample and for the full sample.
22Table 2:
Targets and Outcomes
Number killed per attack Number injured per attack
Number of
City Attacks Mean Median Max Std Mean Median Max Std
Population ≥ 50,000 78 6.2 3.0 29.0 7.3 42.6 34.5 170.0 40.0
Population < 50,000 70 1.4 0.0 17.0 3.4 7.0 2.0 52.0 13.1
p-value (t-test on means) 0.00 *** 0.00 ***
Correlation between target ranking and number killed: 0.38 ***
Correlation between target ranking and number injured: 0.51 ***
Civil 115 5.0 2.0 29.0 6.8 32.5 20.0 170.0 37.2
Military 33 0.3 0.0 4.0 0.85 2.4 2.0 17.0 3.5
p-value (t-test on means) 0.00 *** 0.00 ***
Correlation between civil target target and number killed: 0.31 ***
Correlation between civil target and number injured: 0.36 ***
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for the number of people killed and injured in suicide attacks, stratiﬁed by target
importance and civil vs. military targets, and correlation coeﬃcients between the number of people killed and injured by target
importance and civil vs. military targets. *** denotes signiﬁcance at the 1 percent level.
23Table 3:
Top Five Palestinian Suicide Bombers
Attack Attack Number Number
Name Age Education Organization Date Location Killed Injured
‘Abd al-Baasit ‘Awdeh 25 High School Hamas 3/27/2002 Netanya 29 144
Raa’id ‘Abd al-Hamid 29 Masters’ Candidate Hamas 8/19/2003 Jerusalem 23 115
‘Abd al-Razzaaq Misk
Sa‘eed Hasan Husayn 22 High School Hamas 6/1/2001 Tel Aviv 21 83
al-Hutari
Hanaadi Taysir 29 Law School Graduate PIJ 10/4/2003 Haifa 21 48
‘Abd al-Malik Jaraadaat
Muhammad Hazzaa‘ 22 Masters’ Candidate Hamas 7/18/2002 Jerusalem 19 50
‘Abd al-Rahmaan al-Ghoul
Top-ﬁve mean 25.8 0.60 22.8 88.0
Truncated Sample mean (a) 20.9 0.17 3.0 22.4
p-value (t-test on means) 0.02 *** 0.02 ** 0.00 *** 0.00 ***
Notes: This table lists the top-ﬁve ‘stand-alone’ suicide bombers ranked based on the number of people killed in their attacks. The table
reports name, age, education, terror organization aﬃliation, attack date, attack location, number of people killed, and number of people
injured. p-value of t-tests on the means are reported for age, education, number of people killed, and number of people injured. (a)
truncated sample mean excludes the top-ﬁve suicide bombers. **, *** denote signiﬁcance at the 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.
24Table 4:
Attack Assignments
Dependent Variable = Target Impact or Distance
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Population Population Military Military log(Distance) log(Distance)
≥ 50,000 ≥ 50,000 Target Target (hometown) (headquarters)
Age 0.04 *** 0.05 *** -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.02
(0.00) (0.00) ( 0.32) (0.40) (0.13) (0.44)
Academic -0.02 (a) -0.02 (a) -0.14 *** (a) -0.13 *** (a) -0.01 -0.22
(-0.20) (-0.19) (0.01) (0.01) (0.95) (0.59)
Adjusted R
2 0.30 (b) 0.30 (b) 0.35 (b) 0.35 (b) 0.16 0.32
Observations 148 148 148 148 134 122
Estimation probit logit probit logit OLS OLS
Notes: Regression results of target index (columns 1 and 2), military target (columns 3 and 4), the logarithm of the distance (column
5) between the suicide bomber’s locality and the target, the logarithm of the distance (column 6) between the terror cell headquarters
and the target, on the suicide bomber’s age and an academic degree dummy variable. Additional regressors include terror organization
indicator variables, and a dummy variable for attacks with more than one suicide bomber. Models 1-2 and 5-6 also include a dummy
variable for military targets. Regressions are run under probit (columns 1 and 3), logit (columns 2 and 4),and OLS (columns 5 and 6),
with robust standard errors that assume group-wise clustering at the attack location level. Marginal eﬀects and their associated p-values
(in parentheses) are reported along with R2, and the number of observations. (a) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0
to 1. (b) indicates Pseudo R2. *,**,and *** denote signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
25Table 5:
The Productivity of Suicide Bombers
Dependent Variable = Number of People Killed or Injured in the Attack
Killed Injured Killed Injured Killed Injured
Age -0.16 -0.03 -0.11 -0.03
(0.56) (0.98) (0.62) (0.98)
Academic -4.72 ** -15.10 -4.68 ** -15.15
(0.04) (0.30) (0.03) (0.30)
Target -12.72 -37.60 0.38 23.70 *** -13.50 * -40.21
(0.11) (0.37) (0.84) (0.00) (0.09) (0.36)
Age×Target 0.69 * 2.92 0.64 * 2.91
(0.07) (0.17) (0.07) (0.16)
Academic×Target 5.90 ** 4.66 5.83 ** 4.80
(0.04) (0.76) (0.03) (0.32)
Adjusted R
2 0.24 0.36 0.22 0.33 0.25 0.36
Observations 106 106 106 106 106 106
Notes: This table reports regression results of the number of people that were killed or injured in successful suicide attack (the output of
the production of terror) on the suicide bomber’s age, an academic degree dummy variable, a target index, and interactions between age
and the target index, and academic degree and the target index. Additional regressors include terror organization indicator variables, a
dummy variable for attacks with more than one suicide bomber, and a dummy variable for military targets. Regressions include ﬁxed
eﬀects for suicide attack type. Coeﬃcient estimates for the constant, additional regressors, and ﬁxed eﬀects are not reported for brevity.
Regressions are run under OLS with robust standard errors that assume group-wise clustering at the attack location level. Coeﬃcient
estimates and their associated p-values (in parentheses) are reported along with adjusted R2’s, and the number of observations. *,**,and
*** denote signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
26Table 6:
Characteristics of Caught vs. Uncaught Suicide Bombers
Panel A: Age
Mean Median Min Max Std Number
Full Sample 21.1 20.5 12 48 4.7 148
Caught 18.8 19 12 26 3.3 42
Uncaught 22.0 22 16 48 4.9 106
p-value of a two-sample t-test for equal means: 0.00***
Panel B: Education (education=1 for academic education.)
Mean Median Min Max Std Number
Full Sample 0.18 0 0 1 0.39 148
Caught 0.07 0 0 1 0.26 42
Uncaught 0.23 0 0 1 0.42 106
p-value of a two-sample t-test for equal means: 0.03**
Notes: This table compares age and education for suicide bombers that were caught with those that were not caught.
Mean, median, minimum, maximum, standard deviation and number of observations are reported along with p-value
of t-tests on the means. *,**,and *** denote signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
27Table 7:
The Determinants of Caught Suicide Bombers
Age -0.05 *** -0.04 *** -0.04 *** -0.04 ***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Academic (a) -0.16 *** -0.15 *** -0.16 ** -0.15 ***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Multiple Bombers (a) -0.18 ** -0.17 **
(0.04) (0.05)
Military Target (a) 0.04 0.04
(0.73) (0.75)
Hamas (a) -0.12 -0.11
(0.30) (0.32)
PIJ (a) -0.14 -0.12
(0.14) (0.19)
Fatah (a) -0.10 -0.10
(0.23) (0.21)
Pseudo R
2 0.14 0.14 0.17 0.17
Estimation probit logit probit logit
Observations 148 148 148 148
Notes: Regression results of the probability that a suicide bomber will be caught either before or during his attack on
the suicide bomber’s age and an academic degree dummy variable. Additional regressors include terror organization
indicator variables, a dummy variable for attacks with more than one suicide bomber, and a dummy variable for military
targets. Regressions are run under probit (columns 1 and 3), and logit (columns 2 and 4) with robust standard errors that
assume group-wise clustering at the attack location level. Marginal eﬀects and their associated p-value (in parentheses)
are reported along with Pseudo R2’s, and the number of observations. (a) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable
from 0 to 1. *,**,and *** denote signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
28